On October 2, 2026, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey approved a deal: Poolin’s mining farm assets in Texas would be sold for up to $180 million.

Poolin is a familiar name to veteran miners. It was once the world’s largest Bitcoin mining pool, accounting at its peak for nearly 18% of the network’s computing power. But in September 2022, the company abruptly suspended withdrawals from its wallet and converted users’ crypto balances into IOUs.

Four years later, U.S. bankruptcy filings show that roughly 11,700 users still hold those IOUs, worth a combined $163.7 million, or about 1.146 billion yuan. Before filing for bankruptcy, Poolin owed about $173.1 million in total, with wallet users accounting for 94.6% of that debt.

A company built on helping people mine crypto ended up owing nearly all its debt to users whose funds it held, rather than to equipment vendors or electricity suppliers. How did it come to this?

Pooling Miners to Become the World’s Largest

In November 2017, three former Bitmain employees, Pan Zhibiao, Zhu Fa and Li Tianzhao, founded Poolin.

The mining pool business is straightforward. A single mining rig operating alone might take years to mine a Bitcoin block, so miners connect their machines to a pool and work together. When the pool finds a block, the proceeds are divided according to each miner’s contribution, with the pool collecting a service fee. Put simply, it is carpooling for crypto mining: the pool organizes the participants, keeps the accounts and distributes the proceeds.

When Poolin launched, AntPool, BTC.com and F2Pool were already major players. But Poolin’s team had technical expertise and strong relationships with miners, while its reliable payouts helped it grow quickly. In 2019, its share of Bitcoin computing power approached 18%, briefly making it the world’s largest mining pool.

The scale of Poolin’s success was evident at an industry gathering that year. In September 2019, it hosted the New Era Mining Summit and 2019 Annual Gala in Chengdu, drawing more than 900 industry participants, including representatives from Bixin, MicroBT, Canaan, Innosilicon and Ebang. On stage, Pan Zhibiao presented the new BUMP mining protocol, while Zhu Fa discussed the industry’s shift toward greater professionalization and institutionalization.

That same year, their former employer Bitmain sued the three founders for violating noncompete agreements, seeking about 30 million yuan in damages. The court ultimately found them liable for breaching the agreements but rejected Bitmain’s claim for tens of millions of yuan in losses. The fact that an industry giant went to court against a company less than two years old underscored Poolin’s growing weight at the time.

After becoming the world’s largest mining pool, Poolin began pursuing new sources of revenue, including a wallet, lending and other financial services. That was where the trouble began.

The Split Began in 2020

Mining pools and wallets may both serve miners, but they are fundamentally different businesses.

A mining pool manages computing power. It helps miners mine crypto, calculates their earnings and distributes payouts, earning fees in return. As long as the crypto mined is paid out on time, the risks to miners remain relatively limited even if the company runs into operating problems.

Wallets and lending businesses manage money. Miners deposit crypto on a platform, which may lend it out or invest it in yield-generating products. That exposes the company to financial risk. If market conditions turn or loans cannot be recovered, the resulting shortfall can far exceed fee income.

The issue created a divide inside Poolin. Co-founder Zhu Fa left in March 2020. He recently confirmed exclusively to Computing Power Heart that a major reason for his departure was a disagreement with the team over the direction of the wallet business. His view at the time was that wallets generated little profit while requiring the company to manage user funds and assets, creating a mismatch between risk and return.

Few outsiders knew about the disagreement at the time. Poolin’s eventual bankruptcy had multiple causes and cannot simply be attributed to one person’s departure. But in hindsight, the business that failed two years later was precisely the wallet operation.

Before the wallet failed, however, Poolin made an even more capital-intensive bet.

Texas: Equipment Bought for 600 MW, but Only 100 MW Approved

In 2021, as China launched a nationwide crackdown on crypto mining, miners moved their operations overseas. Poolin followed them to the United States and began building mining farms in Texas.

Building a mining farm is an entirely different undertaking from running a mining pool. A pool relies mainly on technology and servers, while a mining farm requires land, power connections, equipment and buildings. The capital must be spent upfront, with returns coming much later.

The first problem was power. U.S. bankruptcy filings show that the Texas project was planned around 600 MW of power capacity, with equipment purchased at that scale. But only 100 MW was initially approved, about one-sixth of the original target. Without enough power, much of the purchased mining equipment could not be brought online as planned. From 2023 to 2025, the equipment had to be sold at a discount, resulting in losses of about $8.8 million.

At the same time, Poolin’s wallet and financing operations were also under pressure. Bankruptcy filings show that Poolin borrowed against digital assets, with its outstanding loans at one point reaching about $213 million and the pledged digital assets then valued at roughly $355.8 million.

This kind of borrowing carries a particular risk: when crypto prices fall, the collateral loses value as well. As prices declined throughout 2022, Poolin’s lenders began issuing margin calls, effectively telling the company that its collateral was no longer worth enough and that it needed to provide more. When Poolin could not do so, some of the pledged assets were sold to repay the debt. Its liquidity tightened further, and the pressure ultimately fell on users.

Eight Days From “Assets Are Safe” to IOUs

On September 5, 2022, Poolin Wallet announced that it was suspending withdrawals, instant swaps and internal transfers. The notice said user assets were safe and promised a further solution within a week.

Users waited eight days, but withdrawals did not resume. On September 13, Poolin announced six IOU tokens corresponding to BTC, ETH, USDT, LTC, ZEC and DOGE. Users’ original wallet balances were zeroed out and converted one-for-one into the corresponding IOUs.

Consider a miner who originally held 5 BTC in the wallet. After the conversion, the miner held 5 IOU-BTC. The number looked unchanged, but those units were no longer Bitcoin that could be withdrawn at any time. They were five promises from Poolin saying, in effect, “We owe you 5 BTC and will repay you later.” Just eight days separated Poolin’s claim that assets were safe on September 5 from their conversion into IOUs on September 13. Users would be left holding those IOUs for four years.

Miners responded by leaving. In July and August 2022, Poolin was still mining roughly 10% to 11% of all Bitcoin blocks. In the week beginning September 12, its share fell to about 4.6%, followed by roughly 5.5% the next week. These figures measure the share of blocks mined rather than real-time computing power, but the trend was unmistakable: once the wallet ran into trouble, many miners moved their mining rigs out of Poolin.

Poolin had risen to the top on miners’ trust. When that trust disappeared, the computing power followed.

11,700 Users and $163.7 Million

Four years ago, users knew only that they could no longer withdraw their funds. The size of the shortfall remained unclear to outsiders until Poolin’s 2026 U.S. bankruptcy filings disclosed the figures for the first time.

In a declaration filed with the court, Poolin Chief Restructuring Officer Michael DuFrayne said about 11,700 users with account balances exceeding $100 were affected when wallet withdrawals were suspended in 2022. A chief restructuring officer is responsible for sorting out a company’s assets and liabilities during bankruptcy, giving the figure particular significance.

The IOUs held by these users total about $163.7 million and are classified as unsecured claims, meaning no specific assets were pledged against the debt, unlike a mortgage backed by a home. At a rough exchange rate of 7 yuan to the dollar, that equals about 1.146 billion yuan. The average claim is around $14,000 per user, or nearly 100,000 yuan.

But averages obscure wide disparities. Some users are owed only $100 or $200, while others are owed tens of thousands of dollars. Those caught up in the collapse were not only large investors but also many ordinary users. Some simply left their daily crypto mining proceeds in the wallet, some had accumulated Bitcoin there for years, and others deposited funds in pursuit of investment returns. Their money came from different sources, but the outcome was the same: it could not be withdrawn, was converted into IOUs and came with no clear repayment date.

Another comparison puts the scale into perspective. Before filing for bankruptcy, Poolin had total liabilities of about $173.1 million, of which wallet IOUs accounted for roughly $163.7 million, or about 94.6%. The largest debt that brought down the former world-leading mining pool was not for servers or mining farm electricity.

The $163.7 million figure is the amount of claims recorded in the bankruptcy filings. It is not based on current crypto prices, nor is it the amount users are ultimately guaranteed to recover.

Four Years Frozen, With Losses Beyond the Crypto Itself

For many miners, the figures leave out another loss: time.

When Poolin Wallet stopped withdrawals in September 2022, Bitcoin was trading at around $20,000. Over the next four years, it first fell to a low in late 2022, broke through its previous all-time high in 2024 and rose again in 2025. People who held their own Bitcoin could choose to keep it, sell into the rally, or use the money to buy new mining rigs or invest in new mining farms. Poolin Wallet users, whose crypto was frozen, largely lost the ability to make those choices.

Consider a hypothetical miner who had 10 BTC in Poolin Wallet in September 2022. At roughly $20,000 per Bitcoin, the holdings were worth about $200,000. If the miner had retained control of the 10 BTC and sold after Bitcoin rose above $100,000, the proceeds would have been $1 million, a difference of $800,000.

This is, of course, only a hypothetical. Not everyone would have sold at the peak, and a U.S. bankruptcy court would not calculate compensation using the highest price of a bull market. But the example illustrates one point: what was frozen was not only the crypto, but also users’ ability to make their own decisions for four years.

That is especially damaging for miners. Crypto mining is a business that requires constant spending on electricity and equipment, adjustments to computing power, and decisions about when to hold or sell crypto based on market conditions. Funds frozen for four years can mean missing periods of cheap mining rigs or opportunities at new mining farms, or having to seek financing elsewhere simply to keep operating.

There is another practical issue: U.S. bankruptcy proceedings may not value digital-asset claims at today’s Bitcoin price. Even if users eventually recover some cash, it may not be enough to buy back the same amount of BTC they once held.

Is $180 Million Enough? Four Obstacles to Repayment

First, the basic bankruptcy details. On July 22, 2026, Poolin and two U.S. affiliates filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey under lead case number 26-18325. Chapter 11 is a restructuring process: rather than shutting down and liquidating immediately, a company sells assets and addresses its debts under court supervision.

The three debtors are Poolin Technology PTE. LTD., Poolin’s Singapore entity; Lonestar Dream, Inc.; and Lonestar Taproot LLC. On October 2, 2026, the court approved the sale of assets related to the Texas mining farms.

Many miners may instinctively make a simple calculation: Poolin owes wallet users about $164 million, while the mining farms could sell for as much as $180 million. Does that mean there is enough to repay them? It is not that simple, for four reasons.

First, $180 million is the maximum price, not cash already received. About $100 million is payable in cash at closing, while up to another $80 million consists of contingent payments that will be made only if the conditions specified in the deal are met.

Second, proceeds from the mining farm sale must first cover secured claims, transaction costs, bankruptcy expenses and other legally senior debts. The wallet IOUs are unsecured claims and rank behind those obligations.

Third, each of the three companies has its own assets and liabilities. Their money and debts cannot all simply be combined into a single pool.

Fourth, each user’s IOU claim must still be reviewed and allowed individually through the bankruptcy process.

For now, the transaction does not provide enough information to determine what percentage wallet users will recover, and no one can guarantee that all users will receive their full principal. What is clear is that the sale of Poolin’s assets and repayment of its debts are now proceeding under formal supervision by a U.S. court. The company must disclose its assets, liabilities and claims; major asset sales require court oversight; and creditors can review filings and verify their claims.

That does not mean the U.S. government will repay Poolin’s debts, nor does it mean miners are guaranteed full recovery. But decisions about how assets are handled and funds distributed are no longer Poolin’s alone.

What IOU Holders Should Do Now

For Chinese miners holding Poolin IOUs, the most important step now is to confirm whether their claims have been included in the U.S. bankruptcy case.

Official case platform: https://veritaglobal.net/Poolin

The case number is 26-18325. Users can search the platform for their claim records, review relevant court filings and learn how to file a claim.

The proposed claims deadline is 4 p.m. U.S. Eastern Time on December 31, 2026, or 5 a.m. Beijing time on January 1, 2027, subject to final court approval.

Filing or verifying a claim does not guarantee recovery of the principal, but doing so promptly is an important step toward recouping losses.

Poolin’s fall from industry leader to bankruptcy also offers a lesson for the entire crypto mining sector. The company rose to the top on miners’ trust, only to expose their assets to business risks as it expanded. Four years later, a U.S. court has begun addressing Poolin’s assets and liabilities. How much users ultimately recover will depend on the claims review and distribution process.

At the very least, those 11,700 users should not lose their chance to seek legal recovery simply because they lacked access to the necessary information.